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I. LIE DETECTOR TESTS
A. Admission by a Party
In the majority of states, including Florida, the results of a polygraph
test are not admissible as evidence and upon objection are excluded.'
However, an admission made by a party to a polygraph operator during
the administration of the test may be admitted into evidence. In Johnson
v. State,2 the prosecution called a polygraph operator as a witness. He
testified that during the examination the defendant told him he was not
involved in the attempted rape. When the polygraph operator told the
defendant that he thought he was lying, the defendant recanted and ad-
mitted that he was at the scene of the assault. On cross-examination, and
in the presence of the jury, the witness testified that the above conversation
* The decisions surveyed in this article have been reported in volumes 160 through 200
of the Southern Reporter, Second Series.
** Digest Editor, University of Miami Law Review and Student Instructor for Fresh-
man Research and Writing.
1. Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1952).
2. 166 So.2d 798 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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occurred during the administration of a police-requested polygraph ex-
amination. The defendant later took the stand and denied any part in the
crime. On appeal the defendant urged that the admission of any result of
a polygraph test, whether offered directly or by implication, was reversible
error. The court upheld the introduction of the witness' testimony, even
though the jury was aware that he was a polygraph operator as a result
of the state's direct examination. It is not reversible error if the jury learns
that a lie detector test has been taken as long as there are "no inferences
as to the result," or "any inferences that might be raised as to the result
are not prejudicial."'3
B. Stipulation by Parties
An exception to the general rule excluding the results of polygraph
tests was made in State v. Brown.' The lower court, entertaining some
doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, considered such tests on a motion
for a new trial after the prosecution and defense attorneys agreed that the
results of the tests could be so used by the court. After two tests were
conducted, the court ordered a third test. The motion for a new trial was
granted and the state appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal
cited with approval State v. Valdez,5 a recent Arizona case which held that
lie detector tests are admissible on stipulation by the parties. The court in
Valdez stated that, although there is still room for improvement in per-
fecting lie detector tests as a means to determine credibility, they have
reached such a stage that their "results are probative enough to warrant
admissibility upon stipulation"' and they may be considered by a jury.
Finding no substantial difference between that situation and the present
one, the Florida court upheld the trial judge's ruling. In so doing, Florida
joins a minority of states which allow results of lie detector tests after
agreement. It should be noted that in the instant case the results were not
considered by a jury, as was done in Valdez, and the trial judge ordered
the last test on his own motion.
II. EXAMINATION
A. Redirect
Generally, on redirect examination the party calling the witness may
examine him as to matters "which tend to qualify, limit or explain testi-
mony" drawn out on cross-examination.7 A problem arises when on cross-
examination a witness' credibility has been impeached because of a
3. Id. at 805.
4. 177 So.2d 532 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
5. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
6. Id. at 900. Among the objections to the use of lie detector tests are the tendency of
both judges and juries to treat the results of such tests as conclusive, the dissimilarity of
test procedures, and the inability of the jury to evaluate the polygraph operator's opinion.
7. C. McCoRMICxC, EvIDENcE § 32 (1954).
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possible interest in the litigation. In order to explain away this impeaching
testimony, normally incompetent evidence must be drawn from the wit-
ness on redirect. In City of Coral Gables v. Jordan,8 the plaintiff sued for
the death of a motor scooter passenger. The defendant cross-examined the
driver of the scooter as to the investigation that the driver had made of
accident. The questions tended to imply that-the witness had an interest
in the suit. The trial judge ruled that since the defendant opened the door,
the plaintiff, on redirect, could question the witness as to his settlement
with the defendant in order to rebut the inference that the witness was
interested in the suit. On appeal, the court held that the redirect examina-
tion of the witness with respect to the settlement was inadmissible. The
disclosure of a settlement between the defendant and the driver-witness
completely negated the defendant's claim that the witness caused the
accident and violated the policy of Florida in excluding evidence of a set-
tlement.9 A dissenting judge would have allowed the redirect to stand be-
cause by inference the cross-examination affected the witness' credibility:
[W]hile disclosure of a settlement is normally incompetent such
disclosure would be subordinate to the party's right to rehabili-
tate the witness, and the adversary is restricted to a request for
an appropriate limiting instruction.'
B. Administrative Proceedings
In Hargis v. Florida Real Estate Commission," the Commission
called as an adverse witness the person whose license was in issue. The
court stated that the mere calling of such a person to testify as an ad-
verse witness in an administrative proceeding did not per se violate his
right against self-incrimination. Had the proceedings been a criminal case
or had the petitioner been "criminally accused," then the calling of
the petitioner to testify against himself would have automatically violated
his constitutional and statutory privileges.'" In no sense were the proceed-
ings before the Commission a criminal case as the petitioner was not
charged with any crime. a3
III. REFRESHING THE MEMORY
A memorandum which merely stimulates the memory of a witness
need not be introduced into evidence since the testimony of the witness is
independent of the stimulus. In such a case, what constitutes the stimulus
8. 186 So.2d 60 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
9. The court also based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff was not prejudiced on
cross-examination, since as a result of the direct examination conducted by the plaintiff, the
jury already knew that the witness was involved in the accident.
10. City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So.2d 60, 65 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
11. 174 So.2d 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
12. FLA. CoNsT. DECL., OF RIGHTS § 12; FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1965).
13. Ahern v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n; 149 Fla. 706, 6 Sold 857 (1942).
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is immaterial as the testimony of the witness is based only on his inde-
pendent recollection.' 4 In King v. Califane,'6 a police officer made out an
accident report at the scene. The report was filed at the police station and
later the officer made a verbatim copy in his notebook. While testifying
as a defense witness, the police officer was refused permission to refresh
his memory by using his notebook. The appellate court, without going
into why the trial court refused permission, held that the officer should
have been allowed to use his notes to "spur" his independent recollection
even though the notes were not the original ones. It appears that the
appellate court further complicated a relatively simple case by discussing
whether or not the notes were original or copies since that issue is imma-
terial when the notes are merely used to stimulate the memory of a wit-
ness. 
6
IV. OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Expert Witness
In determining whether or not the witness is qualified to testify as an
expert, the court will look to the specialized knowledge he possesses in the
area in which he is to testify. This knowledge may be acquired either
through study of the area under recognized authorities or by experience."
The education of an expert need not be a formal education and home
study of recognized authorities will suffice.' 8 In Santana Marine Service,
Inc., v. McHale19 the plaintiff gave his expert opinion as to why a lifting
device broke and damaged his boat. The court found that since the plain-
tiff had six years of experience in making, installing, and designing lifting
devices and "had done considerable home study of recognized scientific
treatises in the field," he was qualified as an expert to give his opinion.'
The manner in which an expert witness arrives at an opinion does not
go to his competency to testify unless the method is completely improper.2
In a condemnation proceeding the appraiser used the capitalization of a
lease as the method of evaluating a parcel of land. The court upheld the
overruling of an objection to the expert's competency stating that his reli-
ance on this new method would only go to the weight given his testimony
by the jury.22
B.1 Hypothetical Questions
Generally, when an expert witness is asked a hypothetical question,
all evidence disclosed at the trial up to that point should be included in
14. Volusia County Bank v. Bigelow, 45 Fla. 638, 33 So. 704 (1903).
15. 183 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
16. Volusia County Bank v. Bigelow, 45 Fla. 638, 33 So. 704 (1903).
17. Upchurch v. Barnes, 197 So.2d 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
18. Santana Marine Serv., Inc. v. McHale, 346 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1965).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 148.
21. Rochelle v. State Road Dep't, 196 So.2d 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
22. Id. at 479.
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the hypothet.23 However, in Ramos v. State,24 an expert in lottery opera-
tions was asked a hypothetical question based on his past experiences on
the vice squad and the activities he observed as part of a special surveil-
lance team assigned to the defendant, rather than all of the evidence dis-
closed at the trial up to that point. The court nevertheless overruled the
objection to the question and stated that the witness' testimony disclosed
sufficient knowledge of the facts to enable him to reach "a reasonably
accurate conclusion. ' 25
C. Opinions Based on Reports of Others
A medical doctor, who is consulted in a case for the purpose of later
testifying in court, cannot give an opinion as to the cause of the injuries
where the basis for the opinion would be solely what the patient told him. 6
Such medical testimony is considered unreliable. The patient may not tell
the physician the complete truth since the patient is not interested in re-
ceiving any medical treatment from his "testifying physician. 27 When
the medical witness' opinion is based partly on information supplied by the
patient and partly from a personal examination, the opinion is still admis-
sible. The fact that the patient supplied part of the medical history goes
only to the weight given the expert's opinion and not to its admissibility."
V. IMPEACHMENT
The majority rule in the United States is that a party cannot impeach
his own witness by the use of evidence to prove his bad character, but he
may impeach him by a showing of prior inconsistent or contradictory
statements. Under Florida Statutes, section 90.09, however, the witness
must "prove adverse" before such evidence can be introduced. The prob-
lem arises as to what constitutes adversity, since the courts' definitions
have fluctuated from "hostile" to "unfavorable." 29 In Johnson v. State,30
the court interpreted "adverse" as meaning "giving evidence that is preju-
dicial to the party producing the witness."'"
In Johnson, a second degree murder case, the state called a witness
and later the defendant called the same witness. On cross-examination,
the state attempted to impeach the witness as to matters brought out on
the state's cross-examination. The court held that even though the witness
23. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 14 (1954); but see Baker v. State, 30 Fla. 41, 11 So.
492 (1892).
24. 165 So.2d 237 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
25. Id. at 238.
26. Troj v. Smith, 199 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
27. Id.
28. Raydel, Ltd. v. Medcalfe, 162 So.2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, Raydel, Ltd. v. Medcalfe, 178 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1965).
29. Johnson v. State, 178 So.2d 724, 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 728.
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was still the state's witness, the state could impeach him by the use of
inconsistent statements since the witness' testimony was prejudicial to the
state. The court did note that the witness, when testifying for the de-
fendant, was not, strictly speaking, the state's witness. However, the state
had "avouched for his credibility, and will not be allowed to impeach
him"32 except as allowed by statute.
VI. COMPETENCY
Although by statute a wife is competent to testify against her hus-
band in a criminal action,13 neither may disclose confidential or privileged
communication which has occurred between them. In a second degree
murder case, the husband, just after the shooting, said to his wife, "I have
killed the wrong man." 4 Since the statement was a privileged communica-
tion and in addition would clearly negate the husband's defense that the
shooting was accidental, the appellate court held that it was harmful
error to admit this statement into evidence over the defendant's objection.
The statutory provisions that make the wife competent to testify against
her husband do not require her to give testimony which is considered
privileged or confidential.
In Silverman v. Turner,8 the problem arose as to whether an attor-
ney can be required to divulge the source of a loan furnished to his client
for the purpose of posting a supersedeas bond. The attorney stated that
one of the conditions of the loan was that the identity of the lender, an-
other client of the attorney, remain secret. The court held that the
attorney-client privilege was not applicable where, as here, the attorney
"acts in any other capacity than as an attorney, such as a depository, or
as a trustee" and the subject matter in question does not "relate to the
subject matter of the attorney's employment."3
VII. RELEVANCY
A. Character of the Accused
In a criminal case, the prosecution introduced over twenty separate
crimes which the defendant was alleged to have committed. In the great
majority of these, the defendant was alleged to have stolen files from
offices and to have ransomed the property for money. In the case being
tried the defendant was charged with extortion by threatening to blow up
a store unless he was paid a sum of money. The modus operandi in the
prior crimes was sufficiently different from that in the instant case to
negate relevancy on the basis of similarity. Therefore, since the sole
32. Id. at 729.
33. FLA. STAT. § 90.04 (1965) ; FLA. STAT. § 932.31 (1965).
34. Cox v. State, 192 So.2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
35. 188 So.2d 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
36. Id. at 355.
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relevancy of the prior crimes was to show bad character, it was reversible
error to admit such evidence.87
B. Prior Conduct as Evidence of Character
Where a plea of self-defense is involved, in order to prove the de-
cedent's reputation for violence so as to explain the defendant's acts, it
must first be established that the defendant knew of the decedent's repu-
tation.88 However, when testimony is sought to be elicited as to the violent
and dangerous character of the decedent so as to explain or give meaning
to the conduct of the deceased at the time of the killing 9 no prior knowl-
edge of the defendant is necessary. In Cole v. State," just before the de-
fendant killed the decedent, the decedent held a knife in his hand and
slapped the defendant's face. At the trial, the defendant pled self-defense.
The trial court refused to allow testimony which showed that the decedent
was a violent person since the defendant had no prior knowledge of his
past character. On appeal, the conviction was reversed with instructions
to allow the witness' testimony. Since the evidence was uncontradicted as
to the events leading up to the shooting, the testimony of the witness re-
garding the decedent's violent character was admissible "to explain or
give meaning. . . to the conduct of the deceased.")41
C. Other Accidents or Injuries
In Schield Bantum Company v. Greif,4 a personal injury case, the
plaintiff testified that for the past two years her health had been perfect.
The defendant sought to admit into evidence the fact that the plaintiff
had been injured in an accident a few years previously and had been
given a twenty-five per cent permanent partial disability award in a Ken-
tucky workmen's compensation proceeding. Furthermore, some months
before the present accident the plaintiff had asked for a reopening of her
case. This prior accident became relevant because of a conflict in medical
testimony as to the disability in the present case. The trial court denied
the defendant's request. The appellate court reversed the case and ordered
a new trial on the issue of damages holding that the jury should have been
apprised of the prior accident and of the plaintiff's condition prior to
awarding her a money judgment.
D. Tax Returns
In Fryd Construction Corporation v. Freeman, the defendant was
allowed to inspect the plaintiff's federal income tax returns for the past
37. Steppe v. State, 193 So.2d 617 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
38. Freeman v. State, 97 So.2d 633 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957).
39. Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891).
40. 193 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
41. Id. at 50.
42. 161 So.2d 266 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
43. 191 So.2d 487 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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three years, since the returns were relevant to the claim for damages.
Under Rule 1.28 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may in-
spect items which are not privileged. Since copies of income tax returns
are not considered privileged in Florida they may be used in state court
actions." However, the examination of the tax returns must be made in
such a way "that their confidential nature may be reasonably protected." 45
VIII. HEARSAY
A. Res Gestae
A hearsay statement can be admitted into evidence under the res
gestae exception. The requirements are that the statement must be made
by a party or a witness to the transaction; that the statement must be
made at the time of or shortly after the event; and that the statement
must not be relating back to a past event in the form of a narrative state-
ment.46 In State v. Williams4 7 some five to eight minutes after the witness
heard some shots, she went into a store and found the victim sitting up
with a gun in his hand. When the witness asked what had happened, the
victim answered that there had been an attempted robbery and that he
had been shot. The District Court of Appeal, Second District 4 held that
the statement was not a res gestae exception because it was not part of the
robbery or the assault on the deceased. The statement was a narrative of
past events and would still have been a narrative even if the witness had
not asked her questions. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed that part
of the district court opinion holding the testimony inadmissible. 49 The
court reasoned that since the response of the decedent was a direct reply
to, "and a natural emanation or outgrowth of, the question of what had
happened . . .[and] so logical a comment as to exclude the idea of de-
sign or deliberation; and it was substantially contemporaneous with the
offense"' the district court of appeal erred in disturbing the trial court's
determination that the statement was part of the res gestae.
B. Admission Against Interest
When a party makes an admission against his interest, the statement
can come in as an exception to the hearsay rule."' If the party who made
the statement is deceased and another person is "claiming under or in suc-
cession to the deceased declarant,1 52 the statement can be introduced
44. Parker v. Parker, 182 So.2d 498 (Fla. 4th Dist. 19,66).
45. Fryd Constr. Corp. v. Freeman, 191 So.2d 487, 489 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
46. Williams v. State, 188 So.2d 320 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
47. 198 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1967).
48. Williams v. State, 188 So.2d 320 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
49. State v. Williams, 198 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1967).
50. Id. at 23.
51. C. McCoRaIcx, EVIDEXcE § 253 (1954).
52. 13 FLA. JuR. Evidence § 229 (1957).
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against the substituted party. Thus, in Ritter v. Brengle, a statement
made by the now deceased son of the defendant was admissible against
the father when the father was defending an action originally brought
against the son.5"
In a negligence suit against the City of Miami,54 the plaintiff intro-
duced a deposition of the driver of the city's truck. The deposition re-
vealed that the driver knew the brakes had previously failed, although he
was not present when it had happened. One of the main issues involved
was whether the city knew or should have known that the truck's brakes
were defective. The appellate court upheld the admission of the deposition
even though the driver's statements were hearsay. The rationale was that
since the statement was being offered against the declarant as well as his
principal, the city, it came within the admission against interest exception.
In Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc.,55 the plaintiff sued the
defendant and one of its employees for injuries caused in an automobile
accident. At the trial the plaintiff introduced a certified copy of the em-
ployee's plea of guilty in the criminal prosecution which evolved from the
accident. The district court of appeal" refused to recognize the guilty plea
in the criminal action as an admission against interest in the subsequent
civil suit and reversed the judgment for the plaintiff. The court relied on
Florida cases57 which held that a previous criminal conviction could not
be used in a subsequent civil case "to establish the truth of the facts on
which it was rendered."58 The court stated that it was "unable to compre-
hend the distinction"5 between a criminal conviction and a judgment
rendered in a criminal case based on a plea of guilty. The reason given for
this rule of inadmissibility was the vast difference in procedure between
criminal and civil litigation. The supreme court60 reversed the appellate
court and, in re-examining previous Florida cases, noted that although a
conviction in a criminal prosecution could not be used in a subsequent
civil suit to establish the truth of the facts on which it was based, a gen-
erally recognized exception did exist when the criminal conviction was
based on a guilty plea. The theory is that the prior guilty plea is an ad-
mission against interest and can be used in a subsequent civil suit as a
declaration that the fact is true.
In Hines v. Trager Construction Company,61 the defendant filed a
53. 185 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
54. City of Miami v. Fletcher, 167 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
55. 195 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1967).
56. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Boshnack, 184 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
57. Moseley v. Ewing, 79 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1955); Stevens v. Duke, 42 So.2d 361 (Fla.
1949).
58. Stevens v. Duke, 42 So.2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1949).
59. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Boshnack, 184 So.2d 467, 469 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
60. Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1967).
61. 188 So.2d 826 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1966).
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cross-claim against his co-defendant in an attractive nuisance case. Sum-
mary judgment was given against Trager on its cross-claim and the co-
defendant was dropped from the case. Later the plaintiff sought to intro-
duce against Trager a part of Trager's cross-claim as an admission against
interest. The appellate court upheld the objection to the introduction of
the pleadings, stating that while pleadings between parties are considered
admissions, such pleadings refer only to the final pleadings of the parties.
When the co-defendant dropped out of the suit, the cross-claim disap-
peared as if it had never been made.62
C. Testimony Taken in a Former Action
0 owned an automobile which was being driven by D when it became
involved in an accident with X's car. P, D's passenger, sued X. X de-
fended the suits on the grounds that D was the cause of the accident. The
jury found for X and P assigned as error the admission of the testimony
of an expert witness which was taken at a former trial. In that suit, be-
tween the driver and X, the expert witness testified on behalf of X. The
appellee argued that the witness' testimony should be admissible since "it
was given upon such an issue that the party-opponent in that case had the
same interest and motive in his cross-examination that the present oppo-
nent has." 3 The appellate court held that it was error to admit the
transcript into evidence since under Florida Statutes, section 92.22, which
is concerned with evidence used at a former trial, the present party-
opponent P was not in privity with D, the original party-opponent. Privity
requires "mutual or successive relationship to the same right."64 Since P's
right of recovery was in no way dependent upon D's recovery in the
former trial, there was no privity existing between D and P.
IX. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Most of the cases in this area dealt with the problem of whether or
not the fact under consideration was one of general knowledge. A few
cases, as illustrated below, concerned themselves with the limitations put
on the court in judicially noticing facts.
In a breach of contract suit, the court awarded damages to the plain-
tiff only for work already done. Execution of the award was stayed until
two claims of lien were satisfied. Only one of the claims was a part of the
record, but the trial judge took judicial notice of the other claim since he
had also been the judge in that case. The appellate court struck the re-
quirement that the execution be stayed until satisfaction of the second
62. Id. at 830.
63. Osburn v. Stickel, 187 So.2d 89, 91 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
64. Id.
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claim since a court cannot take judicial notice of "a different case pending
or disposed of in the same court but outside the record of the case before
that court."", The court took a rather narrow view in the instant case,
in that the principal of judicial notice would seem to be applicable to
records of a prior case in the same court especially where, as here, the
presiding judge was the same in both cases. One federal court overcame
the needless requirement of formal pleading and proof by declaring that
records of a past case were public records and therefore the court could
take judicial notice of them."
In a suit to compel compliance with a municipal ordinance, the circuit
court declared the ordinance to be unconstitutional. On appeal, 67 it was
held that even though the ordinance was attached to the complaint, it was
never properly admitted into evidence and, therefore, it could not be de-
clared unconstitutional. While statutory law may be judicially noticed by
the court, municipal ordinances must be proven."8
X. ACCIDENT REPORTS
When a police officer arrived on the scene of an accident the de-
fendant regained consciousness and said that she had fainted and thought
it would happen again. The defendant sought to exclude this statement on
the basis that it was an oral accident report and, therefore, a privileged
statement under Florida Statutes, section 317.171. This statute provides
that an accident report made by a party to an accident is confidential and
cannot be used as evidence in a subsequent case arising out of the acci-
dent. The court held that, under the circumstances, the statement was not
part of an accident report. Since the statement was "made immediately
upon regaining consciousness and while still in a state of shock" it could
not be considered a "report to the officer." 69 Furthermore, the statement
was admissible as the hearsay exception of declaration against interest.
In Cooper v. State,7° the police officer, in the process of making out
an accident report, asked the defendant and her husband if he could
obtain a blood test of the defendant. The defendant, while in a hospital,
agreed to the test which later showed the presence of alcohol in her blood.
The results of the test were admitted into evidence and the appellate court
held it to be reversible error. The blood test was performed for the pur-
pose of completing the police officer's report and, therefore, the results
came within the accident report privilege.
65. Gann v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 193 So.2d 200, 201 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
66. Zahn v. Transamerican Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
67. Town of Medley v. Caplan, 191 So.2d 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
68. Id. at 450.
69. Goodis v. Finkelstein, 174 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
70. 183 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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XI. DEAD MAN'S STATUTES"1
A. Subject Matter
A marriage between a woman and her deceased alleged common law
husband is a "transaction" within the meaning of the Dead Man's Stat-
ute72 and her testimony concerning the marriage may be stricken upon
proper objection. In one case,73 the alleged common law wife sought to
have her testimony admitted under the ex necessitate rei exception to the
disqualification of interested parties. This doctrine permits the wife's
testimony if there is no other way to prove the marriage. The district court
of appeal refused to recognize this common law exception because of the
long period of time the Dead Man's Statute has been in effect and the lack
of any modern cases approving this exception to the statute.
Since the statute only applies when a person is testifying in an action
against the estate of a deceased person, it is no bar to the testimony of a
plaintiff-wife concerning her common law marriage with her deceased
husband in a wrongful death action against the tortfeasor.75
In Mathews v. Mathews,76 an heir was prohibited from testifying as
to the identity of a writing, even from documents which were independent
of the suit. The decision was based on the fact that the heir derived
knowledge of the decedent's handwriting from previously observing the
decedent's writing and that this observation was a "transaction" within
the meaning of the Dead Man's Statute. However, the court did note that
a majority of jurisdictions allow an interested party to give an opinion
"as to the handwriting of the decedent, even when on the disputed docu-
ment itself. 77
B. Waiver
The protection of the Dead Man's Statute can be waived either by
failing to object to a person's testimony or by conduct of the parties. 7s In
Sessions v. Summer,79 the defendant was the executor of an estate which
the plaintiff sued for recovery of a loan. The defendant first waived the
statute when he failed to object to the introduction of a check which
evidenced the loan between plaintiff and the deceased. A second waiver
occurred when the defendant cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
71. See generally Comment, Evidence: Legislative Reform for the "Dead Man Statute,"
18 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 693 (1966).
72. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1965).
73. Estate of Silverman v. Lerner, 163 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
74. Id. at 323.
75. Smart v. Foosaner, 169 So.2d 508 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
76. 177 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
77. Id. at 504.
78. 35 FLA. JuR. Witnesses § 123 (1961).
79. 177 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
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not covered on direct. The question concerned communications and trans-
actions the plaintiff had had with the deceased about the loan.
XII. COMMENT BY THE COURT
A trial judge cannot comment on whether the jury should rely on a
witness' statements. Such a comment on the veracity of the witness need
not amount to an indication that the judge is vouching for the witness. All
that is necessary for there to be error is that the court's statement "could
have been so interpreted."0 In a second degree murder case, the judge, in
his charge to the jury, stated that although the defendant was not charged
with carrying a pistol without a license, the jury should consider that fact
in reaching a verdict. No evidence was introduced on the question of
whether or not the defendant had a license for the gun. The jury returned
a verdict of guilty. The defendant's conviction was reversed on two
grounds, the first being that the comment as to his illegal possession of the
gun that killed the deceased suggested that the defendant was not reason-
ably free from guilt and, therefore, hampered his plea of self-defense.8'
The second ground was that the comment suggested that the defendant
was guilty of a collateral crime.8 2
XIII. LEGISLATION
The 1965 legislature enacted a statute providing for privileged com-
munication between a patient and his psychiatrist. 3 In any civil or crim-
inal case, or any administrative or legislative proceeding, the patient or
his authorized representative can refuse to disclose, or can prevent a wit-
ness' disclosure of, any communication between the patient and the psy-
chiatrist. The statute, however, provides two exceptions to the privilege:
(1) Where the court orders a psychiatric examination and informs the
patient that such communications will not be privileged; and (2) In a
civil or criminal case where the patient puts into evidence his mental con-
dition for purposes of using it as a claim or defense.
Florida Statutes, section 92.36(2) was amended in 1967 to allow into
evidence business records kept by means of electronic data processing
machines.84
80. Robinson v. State, 161 So.2d 578 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
81. Wilson v. State, 171 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
82. Id.
83. FLA. STAT. § 90.242 (1965).
84. FLA. LAWS 1967, ch. 67-102.
